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The Concept of ‘Union Interest’ in EU External Trade Law1
BALÁZS HORVÁTHY
Abstract. The category of ‘Union interest’ plays a specifi c role in EU common commercial policy. Its signifi cance 
is especially substantial in the fi eld of trade defence instruments. Even though trade defence instruments refl ect on 
international trade distortions, their main objective is to protect European industries and other economic operators 
against the injurious practices of competitors from third countries, the imposition of restrictive trade measures 
might not only offer advantages to the affected EU industries, but also disadvantages to other actors in the 
European Union. Consequently, the Union interest test makes sure the other side of the coin is looked at and the 
European Union is prevented from imposing trade defence instruments, when the negative impacts on certain 
interested actors are clearly disproportionate to the positive impacts the trade defence measure might have on the 
protected EU industries. The current paper is focusing on the nature and character of the ‘Union interest’. The 
paper starts by defi ning some basic concepts regarding the EU interests in EU law, examines the nature of ‘Union 
interest’ in the trade defence procedures, and then attempts to refl ect on the new trade enforcement regulation and 
the EU general trade interests.
Keywords: Union interest, national interest, public interest, Common Commercial Policy, trade defence 
instruments
1. INTRODUCTION
The category of ‘Union interest’ plays a specifi c role in EU common commercial policy 
(CCP). Its signifi cance is especially substantial in the fi eld of trade defence instruments, i.e. 
anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and safeguard measures .2 The ‘Union interest test’ requires the 
1 This article was carried out as part of the project on ‘Policy Opportunities for Hungary in the 
European Union: the Analysis of the Legal Framework’ conducted by the MTA Lendület–HPOPs 
Research Group. The early version of this paper was presented at the conference on ‘The national 
interest in European Union law and governance’ held in Budapest, HAS CSS Institute for Legal 
Studies, 3–4 July 2014.
2 According to the terminology of the European Commission, the Trade Defence Instruments 
(or TDIs) encompass the anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and safeguard measures. Theoretically, these 
measures can be regarded as defensive trade measures, which are focusing on the import from third 
countries. In addition to these instruments, the EU uses so called offensive measures as well, the most 
important instrument in this fi eld is the trade barriers regulation (TBR). The TBR tries to react to all 
trade barriers (illicit commercial practices) on foreign markets, which might be harmful for the EU 
exporters operating there. The TBR has also a secondary defensive character, because the EU is 
entitled to introduce restrictive measures, if it could not fi nd compromise with the third country in 
question on eliminating the injurious trade barriers. It is worth noting, that also the TBR applies the 
concept of Union interest, which is a substantial requirement during the procedure. In spite of this, the 
following analysis will focus only on the defensive trade measures. For TBR and Union interest see, 
Gugerbauer 2005.
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European Commission to always ensure that the imposition of trade defence measures is in 
the ‘interest of the Union’; in other words, it has to check up on reasons that would run 
counter to the introduction of such measures. Even though trade defence instruments refl ect 
international trade distortions, their main objective is to protect European industries and 
other economic operators against the injurious practices of competitors from third countries, 
and the situation that arose is never simply black and white. The imposition of restrictive 
trade measures might not only offer advantages to the affected EU industries, but also 
disadvantages to other actors in the European Union. Demonstrating with an example it is 
obvious, that an anti-dumping duty increases the price level in the market, which in turn has 
a favourable impact on the competing EU industry, however it also leads to adverse effects 
on consumers or industrial users that are pressed to purchase the product at a higher price. 
Consequently, the Union interest test makes sure the other side of the coin is looked at and 
the European Union is prevented from imposing trade defence  instruments, when the 
negative impacts on certain interested actors are clearly disproportionate to the positive 
impacts the trade defence measure might have on the protected EU industries. It operates as 
a ‘safety valve’ and allows the possibility of avoiding the automatic imposition of duties 
where the trade defence instrument would have an adverse effect on other industrial sectors 
(Maclean–Eccles 1999; Wellhausen 2001).
The consideration of Union interest is compulsory, this obligation has been included in 
the relevant EU law regulating trade defence instruments from the very outset, whereas the 
concept of ‘Union interest’ has been developed over time. It is worth noting that such an 
interest test is not required by the law of the World Trade Organization, therefore the Union 
interest test is an additional component in EU law called a ‘WTO plus’ obligation according 
to the terminology of the European Commission.3 
The concept of ‘Union interest’ is relevant in the current paper from two perspectives. 
First, it is part of an underlying research project,4 which is attempting to analyse the context 
of ‘national interest’ in EU law. Considering this point of view, the following question can 
be posed, whether ‘Union interest’ in external trade law can be regarded as a specifi c 
category of supranational interest, or pertains to a sort of EU public interest consideration. 
Second, Union interest is a topical issue today because EU external trade law, specifi cally 
involving trade defence instruments, has undergone a reform recently, which will have – 
and still has – its footprint on ‘Union interest’ as well. The fi rst part of the paper starts by 
defi ning some basic concepts regarding EU interests in EU law (2. The ‘Union interest’ as 
the category of EU law), the second part examines the nature of ‘Union interest’ in trade 
defence procedures (3. The ‘Union interest’ and the EU Trade Defence Instruments), then 
the fourth chapter attempts to refl ect on the new trade enforcement regulation and EU 
general trade interests (4. Defending the EU trade interest in the new Trade Enforcement 
Regulation), and fi nally, the paper is closed by the conclusions (5. Conclusion – The ‘Union 
interest’ as a specifi c public policy consideration). 
3 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on 
modernisation of trade defence instruments adapting trade defence instruments to the current needs of 
the European economy, COM(2013) 191 fi nal, 3.
4 ‘Policy Opportunities for Hungary in the European Union: the Analysis of the Legal 
Framework’, MTA Lendület–HPOPs Research Group. More information: http://hpops.tk.mta.hu/en
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2. ‘UNION INTEREST’ AS A CATEGORY OF EU LAW
As indicated above, the paper addresses the basic legal concept of ‘Union interest’ as the 
main question, therefore the analysis here will rely predominantly upon EU law 
considerations. However, it is also questionable whether Union interest is related somehow 
to the category of national interest: Is ‘Union interest’ a kind of own national – or to be more 
precise, supranational – interest, or are these incomparable categories? It is not within the 
scope of this paper to present all the theories on national interest from the realist Morgenthau 
to the newest constructivist theories of international relations, therefore here we refer only to 
a general defi nition: national interest includes the perceived needs and desires of one state in 
relation to other states comprising the external environment (Nuechterlein 1976), in other 
words national interest always says what is best for a society in foreign affairs (Rosenau 
1968). National interest is usually linked to sovereignty, therefore the category of national 
interest can be normally applied to sovereign states.5 However, it can be argued that even if 
the EU is not a sovereign state, it can exercise exclusive competences in certain policy 
fi elds, including CCP. Morgenthau did not exclude the possibility of applying national 
interest to other formations than sovereign states either.6 It is also important that there is a 
differentiation in the literature between national and public interest, thus the defi nition draws 
a distinction between the external and internal (domestic) environment of a country; and the 
latter is usually referred to as the sphere of public interest.7 
The EU interest or common interest came up in several places in the founding treaties 
and secondary legislation as well. The ECSC Treaty referred already to more categories of 
interests: essential interests (“Resolved to substitute for age-old rivalries the merging of 
their essential interests; to create, by establishing an economic community…”),8 common 
interests (“The institutions of the Community shall, within the limits of their respective 
powers, in the common interest”),9 and specifi c interests of “workers and consumers” in a 
context where the rights to undertakings10 were highlighted in the fi rst founding treaty. 
Today, the founding treaties encompass more categories of ‘interests’. The Treaty on the 
European Union (TEU) refers to the ‘interests of the European Union’,11 ‘fundamental 
interests’12 of the EU, ‘general interest’13 of the EU and introduces the category of ‘strategic 
  5 The sovereignty was not an explicit requirement in Morgenthau’s theory, however the power 
as his centre-category has been applied only for sovereign countries, see Morgenthau 1973, 27–39. 
  6 “When the national state will have been replaced by another mode of political organization, 
foreign policy must then protect the interest in survival of that new organization” (Morgenthau 1952).
  7 This distinction was made quite early in the literature, Charles Beard (Beard 1934) was one 
of the fi rst to distinguish national from “public interest,” which was used in reference to the domestic 
policies of nations. 
  8 ECSC Treaty, Preamble, paragraph 5.
  9 ECSC Treaty, Article 3.
10 ECSC Treaty, Article 48.
11 TEU Article 24: “The Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual 
political solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union 
or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.”
12 TEU Article 21: “…The Union shall defi ne and pursue common policies and actions, and 
shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fi elds of international relations, in order to (…) 
safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity …”.
13 TEU Article 17: “…The Commission shall promote the general interest of the Union and take 
appropriate initiatives to that end. It shall ensure the application of the Treaties, and of measures 
adopted by the institutions pursuant to them.”
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interest’14 as well. Moreover, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
applies the formulation of ‘fi nancial interest’.15 The founding treaties do not defi ne the 
meaning and content of these categories. Logically, the interest of the Union can be based 
on the interest of the EU itself, as an (relatively) independent and specifi c (supranational) 
actor; the common interest of Member States; and also on the partial and specifi c interests 
of individual actors, e.g. companies, consumers, workers etc. The trade interest of the EU, 
or specifi cally the ‘Union interest’ is not mentioned in the founding treaties at all, but – as 
the next chapter will show – the EU regulations concerning trade defence instruments set 
out the main provisions with regard to ‘Union interest’. 
3. ‘UNION INTEREST’ AND EU TRADE DEFENCE INSTRUMENTS
3.1. The interest test in international economic law
The International Economic Law basis for using Trade Defence Instruments is set out by 
the law of the World Trade Organisation. The anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures are 
the subject of Article VI of GATT and two separate agreements,16 moreover, Article XIX of 
GATT and a specifi c agreement disciplines the application of safeguard measures, which 
have less practical importance here.17 The European Union as an effi cient user of these 
trade measures implements the WTO framework into EU law in regulations and applies 
several additional conditions that are not part of the WTO legal basis. As mentioned earlier 
the typical example is the Union interest test, since the WTO framework does not prescribe 
any obligation of Member States that requires the consideration of the interest of specifi c 
actors in the procedure when deciding on the necessity of a given trade defence measure. 
However it does not mean that WTO law precludes the application of specifi c interest tests 
on WTO members. Quite the contrary, the WTO Agreement on Safeguards explicitly refers 
to the signifi cance of specifi c interests as ‘public interest’ considerations within its 
procedural chapter: the anti-dumping investigation “[…] shall include reasonable public 
notice to all interested parties and public hearings or other appropriate means in which 
importers, exporters and other interested parties could present evidence and their views, 
including the opportunity to respond to the presentations of other parties and to submit their 
views, inter alia, as to whether or not the application of a safeguard measure would be in 
the public interest.”18 
Unlike the Agreement on Safeguards, the Anti-Dumping Agreement as well as the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures do not explicitly require a specifi c 
interest test, however these agreements provide signifi cant policy space with regard to the 
14 TEU Article 22: “…On the basis of the principles and objectives set out in Article 21, the 
European Council shall identify the strategic interests and objectives of the Union.  Decisions of the 
European Council on the strategic interests and objectives of the Union shall relate to the common 
foreign and security policy and to other areas of the external action of the Union.”
15 TFEU Article 86: “…In order to combat crimes affecting the fi nancial interests of the Union, 
the Council, by means of regulations adopted in accordance with a special legislative procedure, may 
establish a European Public Prosecutor’s Offi ce from Eurojust.”
16 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
1994; Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
17 Agreement on Safeguards.
18 WTO Agreement on Safeguards, Article 3.1. For procedural requirements see Lee 2014. 
at 120.
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imposition of measures. Both agreements encourage members to make the imposition of 
duties voluntary, and not mandatory. The Anti-Dumping Agreement prescribes that any 
decision on whether or not to impose an anti-dumping duty in cases where all requirements 
for the imposition have been fulfi lled are decisions to be made by the authorities of the 
importing Member.19 The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures includes 
the same provision with regard to the autonomy of the Members’ authorities and specifi es 
that procedures “[…] would allow the authorities concerned to take due account of 
representations made by domestic interested parties whose interests might be adversely 
affected by the imposition of a countervailing duty.”20 Regarding this term, the ‘domestic 
interested parties’ shall include consumers and industrial users of the imported product 
subject to investigation.21 Furthermore, both agreements prescribe that the Countries have 
to provide opportunities for industrial users of the product under investigation, as well as 
representative consumer organisations in cases where the product is commonly sold at the 
retail level to provide information which is relevant to the investigation regarding dumping 
(or subsidy), injury and causality.22
The relevant WTO provisions show that WTO Members have considerable autonomy 
to decide on trade defence measures and specifi c considerations for introducing trade 
measures at a lower level, or not imposing trade defence instruments at all. Consequently, 
the ‘Union interest test’ applied by the European Union is not incompatible with the 
requirements of international economic law in advance. Although the EU has the most 
developed practice in balancing interests of specifi c domestic actors, other WTO Members, 
e.g., Australia, Canada, China, India, New Zealand, South Africa23 and Ukraine (Kotsiubska 
2011) can apply the public interest test as well. 
3.2. The EU law framework
As noted above, the EU trade defence measures, namely the anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and 
safeguard measures require the consideration of the ‘Union interest’. The basis regulations 
implementing WTO law specify the requirements of the ‘Union interest test’. The less 
comprehensive provisions are included in the basis regulation with respect to the safeguard 
measures,24 referring to the rights of the interested parties25 and applying the general phrase 
of ‘where the Community’s interests so require’26 the EU is entitled to decide on the 
imposition of safeguard measures. 
19 Anti-Dumping Agreement, Article 9.1.
20 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Article 19.2.
21 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, See Footnote for Article 19.2.
22 Anti-Dumping Agreement, Article 6.12., Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures, Article 12.10.
23 Australia, New Zealand and South Africa have no formal provisions but the authorities can 
exercise discretion as to whether to apply duties or not. India and China mention public interest in 
their legislative framework but no evidence of application can be found. See Evaluation of the 
European Union’s Trade Defence Instruments. Final Evaluation Study (27 February 2012) Volume 1: 
Main Report. Bkp Development Research & Consulting, 2012, 22.
24 Council Regulation (EC) No 260/2009 of 7 July 2009 on common rules for imports. Due to 
the low number of safeguard cases, the measure plays no important role in the analysis of the Union 
interest. See for a short and early examination on this issue, Creally 1992, at 141.
25 Council Regulation (EC) No 260/2009, Article 6.5.
26 Council Regulation (EC) No 260/2009, Article 16.
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The basis regulations on anti-dumping, and anti-subsidy measures, however, go one 
step further and set out the detailed framework of ‘Community interest’. The most important 
elements of the interest test according to the basis regulations are as follows:27 
– determination as to whether the Community interest calls for intervention shall be 
based on an appreciation of all the various interests taken as a whole, including the interests 
of domestic industry, users and consumers, and a determination shall only be made where 
all parties have been given the opportunity to make their views known;
– the need to eliminate the trade distorting effects of injurious dumping or subsidisation 
and restore effective competition shall be given special consideration;
– in order to provide a sound basis on which the authorities can take an account of all 
views and information in the decision as to whether or not impose measures is in the 
Community interest, the complainants, importers and their representative associations, 
representative users and representative consumer organisations may make themselves 
known and provide information to the Commission; 
– information shall only be taken into account where it is supported by actual evidence 
which substantiates its validity,
– measures may not be applied where the authorities, on the basis of all the information 
submitted, can clearly conclude that it is not in the Community interest to apply such 
measures.
Consequently the Commission as the EU authority responsible for conducting trade 
defence procedures, has to consider various interests ‘taken as a whole’, and the interested 
parties have the right to provide information to the Commission. On the other hand, the 
Commission has to hear the interested parties, and take into consideration those claims 
supported by evidence. 
In other words, the Commission has to conduct a specifi c ‘Union interest test’ in order 
to prove whether the prospected trade defence measures are in the Union interest or not. It 
can be said that, above all, there is a presumption28 that the EU is interested in implementing 
the intended measures, e.g. anti-dumping duties, etc., because these measures are generally 
reactions to unfair import activities arising from third countries (the only exception is the 
safeguard measure, since that does not address unfair but instead harmful imports). 
Therefore, the ‘Union interest test’ has the objective of rebutting this presumption, and 
when the Commission can conclude that it is not in the interest of the EU, the measures at 
stake may not be applied.29 Moreover, these formulations suggest that the Commission 
possesses a wide margin of discretion in deciding what is in fact in the interest of the Union 
27 Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped 
imports from countries not members of the European Community, Article 21; Council Regulation 
(EC) No 597/2009 of 11 June 2009 on protection against subsidised imports from countries not 
members of the European Community, Article 31.
28 Also the European Commission refers to the concept of ‘rebuttable presumption’, see: Draft 
Guidelines on Union Interest, DG Trade Working Document, not yet adopted, p. 4. The draft is 
available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/april/tradoc_150839.pdf
29 In addition to decisions about the imposition of provisional or defi nitive measures, the two 
basic Regulations also state that Union interest must be considered in a number of other decisions to 
be made during trade defence investigations, i.e. when deciding whether or not to terminate an 
investigation following the withdrawal of a complaint, or suspend measures.
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(Community). Therefore the next question is how the Commission applies the interest test 
and the answer to that can help in specifying the (abstract) nature of the Union interest as 
well. 
3.3. The nature of the ‘Union interest’
Three main questions have to be posed when seeking for the nature of the ‘Union interest’. 
First, it is important to determine which considerations, factors fall within the scope of the 
concept of ‘Union interest’, second, it is to be answered whose interest should be taken into 
consideration, and the third question is how the Commission evaluates these partial 
interests.
3.3.1. The relevant factors concerning ‘Union interest’
The basic regulations fail to determine which effects of the measures are to be considered in 
the Union interest test. However, the European Union’s practice presents explanations on 
the relevant considerations. In “Footwear with uppers of leather originating in the People’s 
Republic of China and Vietnam” case30 the council regulation on the imposition of a fi nal 
duty highlighted that the interest test is an economic analysis focussing on the economic 
impact of taking or not taking anti-dumping measures on operators within the EU. In terms 
of that, it is not a tool by which anti-dumping investigations can be instrumentalised for 
general political considerations relating to foreign policy, development policy, etc. The 
Council refers also to the interested parties listed in Article 21 of the basic Regulation. 
While this list is not exhaustive (in some investigations, suppliers of the raw materials for 
the product concerned have also made comments and these comments have been taken into 
account), it follows clearly from the types of parties mentioned that only the economic 
effects on the parties within the Community are at stake in this test.31 
Despite of the intent of EU authorities to restrict considerations only to economic 
factors, parties in procedures are attempting to submit claims based on other, e.g. 
environmental policy factors. In the “Biodiesel originating in the USA” case,32 an 
environmental argument was also submitted, namely, one interested party alleged an 
incoherence of the anti-dumping proceeding with international and EU policy decisions to 
promote bio-fuels production and sales related to environmental protection and reduce the 
dependency on mineral fuels. The Commission rejected this argument in its regulation on a 
provisional anti-dumping duty, emphasising that the Union interest test according to the 
basic regulation requires that special consideration be given to the need to eliminate trade 
distorting effects of injurious dumping and restore effective competition. Against this 
background, general considerations on environmental protection and the supply of mineral 
diesel cannot be taken into account in the analysis and at the same time cannot justify unfair 
trade practices.33
30 Council Regulation (EC) No 1472/2006 of 5 October 2006 imposing a defi nitive anti-
dumping duty and collecting defi nitely the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain footwear 
with uppers of leather originating in the People’s Republic of China and Vietnam.
31 Council Regulation (EC) No 1472/2006, recital 279.
32 Commission Regulation (EC) No 193/2009 of 11 March 2009 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imports of biodiesel originating in the United States of America.
33 Commission Regulation (EC) No 193/2009, recitals 157–158.
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As a result, non-economic considerations are not normally addressed in the Union 
interest test and the Commission and/or the Council are trying to reject such arguments. 
Therefore the answer to the fi rst question is that ‘Union interest’ refers defi nitely to 
economic considerations (Van Bael–Bellis 2011, Hartmann 2012).
3.3.2. The relevant stakeholders
The basic regulations include a list of stakeholders whose interests must be considered in 
the Union interest test (Union industry, industrial users and consumers). This list is non-
exhaustive, therefore the EU authorities can take into consideration other parties’ interests 
as well (importers, suppliers to the Union industry), but the method of considering these 
categories of interests is very similar to the examination of the three standard types of 
interests (Van Bael – Bellis 2011, Hartmann 2012).34 
a) Union industry
The expected impact of measures on the Union industry is always addressed in the test. The 
consequences of trade defence measure are higher prices, therefore the competing EU 
industry is able to increase sales at a higher price, which generally improve the profi tability 
of the industry. In the “Footwear with uppers of leather originating in the People’s Republic 
of China and Vietnam” case the investigation led to more specifi c fi ndings: EU authorities 
considered that imposing measures, i.e. removing materially injurious dumping, would 
allow the Community industry to maintain its activity and bring an end to the successive 
closures and job losses it faced over the last years, and the adverse effects that the measures 
may have on certain other economic operators in the EU are not disproportionate compared 
to those benefi cial effects for the EU industry.35 Moreover, the EU authorities assess the 
likely impact of a non-imposition of measures on the Union industry as well. The fi ndings 
typically predict the further deterioration of the Union industry’s sales volume, market 
share and profi tability, leading to lower investment, production cuts and job losses. In 
certain cases this analysis refers only to the situation before the imposition, e.g. of a 
provisional duty, when the dumped or subsidised import was damaging the EU industry. In 
the “Footwear with uppers of leather originating in the People’s Republic of China and 
Vietnam” case, for instance, it was noted that the decrease in production volume of the EU 
footwear industry, and thus decline in market share, was accelerated by the emergence of 
dumped imports.36 
b) Industrial user’s interests
As the imposition of measures tends to increase users’ costs – they can access the product at 
a higher price –, users are typically not interested in introducing trade defence instruments. 
In addition to increasing prices, other frequent arguments made by users against measures 
are that they tend to increase unfair competition on the product’s downstream market – i.e. 
users are afraid of being affected by dumping in their market – and have a negative impact 
on the security of supply and product choice.37 Although the EU authorities frequently 
34 For detailed analysis: Evaluation of the European Union’s Trade Defence Instruments. Final 
Evaluation Study (27 February 2012) Volume 1: Main Report. Bkp Development Research & 
Consulting, 2012.
35 Council Regulation (EC) No 1472/2006, recital 286.
36 Council Regulation (EC) No 1472/2006, recital 246.
37 Evaluation of the European Union’s Trade Defence Instruments. Final Evaluation Study (27 
February 2012) Volume 1: Main Report. Bkp Development Research & Consulting, 2012, 333.
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recognise the effect on prices induced by the measures, the standard argument is that the 
product concerned only accounts for a low share in the users’ production costs. On the other 
hand, the consideration of negatively affected users is occasionally acknowledged. In the 
“Synthetic staple fi bres of polyesters (PSF) originating in Malaysia and Taiwan” case the 
EU terminated the procedure38 based predominantly on the grounds that the imposition of 
measures would have a negative effect on users. A large number of users and users 
associations came forward and claimed that the level of measures was particularly high and 
that they were, as a consequence, prevented from importing from their largest sources of 
supply in Asia. The analysis carried out on the possible impact of the imposition of measures 
revealed that the bedding and upholstering industry may probably be more sensitive to 
possible raw material price increases than the spinning sector. Manufacturers of pillows, 
quilts, cushions, upholstery etc. had a profi t margin below 5% on average and the analysis 
showed that the likely impact on their cost of production might have been as high as 6-8%. 
Therefore the conclusion was that due to such an increase in costs, and the fact that the 
bedding industry will be seriously affected by the increasing competition they are facing 
from China on fi nished products, any decision to impose anti-dumping duties on imports 
from Malaysia and Taiwan would have led to a further weakening in their competitiveness.39 
Based on these arguments, the Commission terminated the procedure. 
c) Consumers’ interests
The effect of measures on consumer interests40 is addressed in only a minority of cases. In 
the remaining cases, the Commission usually found that the impact of measures on 
consumers was insignifi cant. As an illustration, the “Sweetcorn in kernels originating in 
Thailand” case can be cited,41 in which two trading organisations also submitted 
observations. As the analysis has shown, the average spending on sweetcorn per household 
is very limited (up to EUR 5 per year). Taking into account the moderate level of the current 
measures, the Commission concluded that the effects of the continued imposition of 
measures would likely be negligible for consumers.42 Interestingly, not only consumers’ 
representatives used to submit contributions to the procedures. It can frequently happen that 
affected exporters argue with the Commission on the likely effects of the measures on 
consumers. In the “Footwear with uppers of leather originating in the People’s Republic of 
China and Vietnam” case the provisional conclusion was that consumer leather footwear 
prices would only be marginally affected by the imposition of defi nitive measures. No 
representations were received from consumers’ organisations following the publication of 
38 2007/430/EC Commission Decision of 19 June 2007 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning imports of synthetic staple fi bres of polyesters (PSF) originating in Malaysia and Taiwan 
and releasing the amounts secured by way of the provisional duties imposed.
39 2007/430/EC: Commission Decision, recitals 12–26.
40 Only consumer organisations have standing in the procedure. Individual consumers have no 
right to take part in the Union interest test, see: T-256/97, Bureau européen des unions des 
consommateurs (BEUC) v Commission of the European Communities, ECR 2000-II 101, 
paragraph 77.
41 Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 875/2013 of 2 September 2013  imposing a 
defi nitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain prepared or preserved sweetcorn in kernels 
originating in Thailand following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EC) No 
1225/2009,
42 Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 875/2013, recitals 127–129.
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the imposition of provisional measures, therefore the interest of consumers was not 
challenged by any association. However, certain exporting producers claimed that they did 
not agree with the fi ndings concerning the limited impact of measures on consumers, and 
that those measures would result in a major increase in household costs. The Commission 
rejected these arguments referring to the fact, that exporting producers do not have standing 
with respect to Community interest under anti-dumping rules. Their points have nevertheless 
been analysed for the sake of argument. In spite of this clear legal background, the 
Commission fi nally analysed the substance of the argument, but concluded the imposition 
of defi nitive measures on the product concerned would not be against the overall interest of 
consumers.43
3.3.3. Specifi city of the Commission’s procedure and procedural reform
The Union interest test may lead to the non-imposition of measures or termination of 
procedures. Cases which were stopped based on Union interest considerations are in 
relatively low number.44 
As the Union interest test takes a micro-economic approach, by considering individual 
stakeholders’ interests, the question arises as to how the Commission evaluates these 
interests, or how these interests are to be aggregated into the Union interest. Especially in 
view of the fact that interests of different stakeholders will typically confl ict with one 
another, the issue of weighting of interests becomes important (Van Bael–Bellis 2011, 
Hartmann 2012). 
However, according to the practice of the Commission, the Union interest test is not a 
cost-benefi t analysis in the strict sense. While the various interests are put in balance, they 
are not weighed against each other in a mathematical equation, not least because of obvious 
methodological diffi culties in quantifying each factor with a reasonable margin of security 
within the time available, and furthermore there is not just one generally accepted model for 
a cost-benefi t analysis.45 This is also the reason why the basic regulations stipulate that the 
need to restore effective competition shall be given special consideration and measures may 
not be applied, on the basis of the information submitted, where it can clearly be concluded 
that it is not in the Community interest to apply such measures. In other words – according 
to the argumentation of the Commission –, the law accepts that trade defence measures 
have certain negative effects on those parties which are typically not in favour of such 
43 Council Regulation (EC) No 1472/2006, recitals 248–258.
44 See e.g. “imports of recordable compact discs (CD+/–R) originating in the People’s Republic 
of China, Hong Kong and Malaysia” case, the Commission concluded that the imposition of measures 
would, on the one hand, have substantial negative effects on importers, distributors, retailers and 
consumers of the product concerned, while on the other hand, the Community industry is unlikely to 
obtain any signifi cant benefi ts. It was therefore considered that the imposition of measures would be 
disproportionate and against the Community interest and as a consequence, the Commission 
terminated the procedure (Commission Decision of 3 November 2006 terminating the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning imports of recordable compact discs (CD+/–R) originating in the People’s 
Republic of China, Hong Kong and Malaysia, recital 116.) The same conclusion was reached in 
“imports of recordable digital versatile discs (DVD+/–R) originating in the People’s Republic of 
China, Hong Kong and Taiwan” case (Commission Decision of 20 October 2006 terminating the anti-
dumping proceeding concerning imports of recordable digital versatile discs (DVD+/–R) originating 
in the People’s Republic of China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, recital 41).
45 Council Regulation (EC) No 1472/2006, recital 279.
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measures. And measures would only be considered as not in the interest of the Community, 
if they had disproportionate effects on the aforementioned parties.46 The interests of the 
Union industry are given more weight than the interests of other stakeholders, for instance, 
the main focus of an antidumping investigation is put on the competing EU industry, 
because the most important objective is to restore effective competition, and only secondly, 
are the interests of other stakeholders to be taken into consideration (Didier 2001, Hartmann 
2012).  
Finally it is worth noting, that trade defence instruments have actually undergone a 
substantial reform. In April 2013, the European Commission adopted a Communication on 
the modernisation of Trade Defence Instruments which contained both legislative and non-
legislative proposals.47 This was the second time the Commission attempted to bring 
changes to the EU’s trade defence measures, which were last substantially amended in the 
1990s. The fi rst attempt in 2006 met with such resistance that it had to be abandoned. But 
the new regulatory reform has been successful; the basic regulations on protection against 
dumped imports against subsidised imports have been modifi ed. 
Probably from the point of view of the ‘Union interest test’, the most important 
consequence is that trade defence instruments will be subject in the future to new decision-
making rules, since the reform amendment modifi ed the comitology rules as well. Under 
the new regulatory framework, defi nitive trade defence measures can be imposed by a 
Commission Regulation. Member states have the possibility of asking for amendments or 
appeal against the Commission’s proposal in an appeal committee, which is only able to 
overturn the Commission proposal with a qualifi ed majority. It is an entirely new situation, 
because previously, defi nitive anti-dumping and countervailing measures were imposed by 
a Council Regulation (following a Commission proposal). 
This procedural amendment addressed a serious problem of political nature regarding 
Union interest. This was because, while the Commission has made several attempts to 
defi ne the concept Union interest in legal terms, a parallel political notion of Union interest 
developed in the Council over the last decades (Maclean–Eccles 1999; Wellhausen 2001). 
This was the notion that the concept of Union or earlier Community interest was in fact an 
expression of the collective national interests of the majority of Member States, particularly 
manifested in the Council of Ministers. This opened the door allowing other interests of 
Member States to be expressed. Realising that the administrative procedure did not 
recognize their commercial interests adequately, interested parties, particularly industrial 
user groups and distributors, turned their attention toward lobbying Member States to 
oppose the adoption of measures. Obviously, if enough Member States opposed the adoption 
of measures, the Council could block any proposal. By trying to persuade government 
representatives that anti-dumping duties would cause damage to specifi c industrial user 
groups located in their countries, these groups tried to use extra-procedural means to 
achieve their ends.48
46 Council Regulation (EC) No 1472/2006, recital 279.
47 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on 
modernisation of trade defence instruments adapting trade defence instruments to the current needs of 
the European economy. COM(2013) 191 fi nal.
48 The best example to illustrate this is probably the Soda Ash case from the 1990s. The EU 
glass industry, which used signifi cant quantities of soda ash in its production process, actively lobbied 
the individual Member States to prevent the adoption of defi nitive anti-dumping duties. Imposing 
these duties, argued the glass industry, would increase their production costs and render them less 
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4. DEFENDING THE EU TRADE INTEREST IN THE NEW TRADE 
ENFORCEMENT REGULATION
While the ‘Union interest test’ is based on the aggregated, partial interests of stakeholders 
in trade defence procedures, a new regulation targets the enforcement of a more abstract 
category of trade interest in the European Union. In May 2014, the Council adopted this 
regulation concerning the exercise of the Union’s rights for the application and enforcement 
of international trade rules (Horváthy 2014).49 The Regulation will introduce a new 
horizontal framework to enhance the EU’s ability to enforce its interests in the international 
trading system and take measures against third countries that violate obligations stemming 
from international multi- and bilateral trade agreements. Previously the EU was able to 
react to these restrictive measures of its trading partners only in an ad hoc manner, therefore 
the new Regulation will fi ll an existing procedural gap in Common Commercial Policy. 
Consequently the draft Regulation in 201250 intended to take into consideration the fact that 
the EU did not yet have a horizontal framework on effi cient and swift reactions to the 
unlawful measures of trading partner countries. Moreover, the proposal might have been a 
remedy to the slightly paradoxical situation that the Commission has had to face after the 
Treaty of Lisbon entered into force. Namely, the Lisbon amendment generally introduced 
ordinary legislative procedure in the fi eld of Common Commercial Policy, consequently, in 
terms of Article 207 TFEU, the Council and European Parliament are already acting as co-
legislators in relation to the measures on implementation of trade policy as well. The new 
procedural framework, on the one hand, was a substantial commitment to the democratic 
legitimacy of EU trade policy, but on the other hand, particularly as a consequence of the 
European Parliament’s participation, the legislative procedures became more complex and 
signifi cantly slowed down after treaty reform. Enforcement of trade interests under trade 
agreements concluded by the EU, however, requires adopting and implementing measures 
in rapid procedural frameworks within strict deadlines, to which the standard EU law-
making methods can hardly respond that can draw out the procedures up to thirty months. 
Therefore it was appropriate and reasonable to delegate these powers from the European 
Parliament and Council to the European Commission as typical executive functions and lay 
down a predictable framework for the adoption of acts that serve the enforcement of EU 
trading interests vis-à-vis third countries. The proposal was adopted by the Parliament with 
amendments on 2 April, 2014, then by the Council on 8 May 2014.
The main objective of the adopted Regulation is to address the effective and timely 
exercise of the Union’s rights to suspend or withdraw concessions or other obligations 
internationally competitive. While the Commission effectively ignored their arguments in its 
Community interest assessment of the matter, seven Member States sympathized with the case of 
Community glass producers and refused to support defi nitive anti-dumping measures. So the 
implications for TDI proceedings are signifi cant (Maclean–Eccles 1999; Wellhausen 2001).
49 Regulation (EU) No 654/2014 Of The European Parliament And Of The Council of 15 May 
2014 concerning the exercise of the Union’s rights for the application and enforcement of international 
trade rules and amending Council Regulation (EC) No 3286/94 laying down Community procedures 
in the fi eld of the common commercial policy in order to ensure the exercise of the Community’s 
rights under international trade rules, in particular those established under the auspices of the World 
Trade Organization.
50 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the 
exercise of the Union’s rights for the application and enforcement of international trade rules 
COM(2012) 773 fi nal.
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arising from international trade agreements, including both multilateral and bilateral 
agreements to which the EU is a party. The above objectives can be achieved within the 
scope of the Regulation, which is limited to the following three subjects.
a)  Retaliatory actions against third countries following dispute settlement mechanisms 
under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), as well as under other 
international trade agreements, including regional or bilateral agreements
The Regulation provides a procedural tool for making decisions, when the EU has been 
authorised to suspend concessions or other obligations following dispute settlement 
procedures. However, it is important to note that the policy leeway of the EU in these cases 
is substantially limited by WTO law, or the provisions of other relevant trade agreements. 
As for WTO law, e.g. Article 22 of DSU – on the principles of compensation and suspension 
of concessions – lays down a strict order in choosing which concessions or obligations have 
to be suspended, i.e. the complaining party should fi rst seek to suspend concessions in the 
same sector as that in which the violation was declared; then as a ‘cross-sectoral’ retaliation, 
it is allowed to suspend concessions in relation to other sectors under the same agreement; 
and only thirdly, in a ‘case of last resort’, are the WTO members entitled to introduce 
‘cross-agreement’ retaliation actions (e.g. lifting concessions in the fi eld of GATS in 
response to a violation of GATT). Other regional or bilateral agreements include provisions 
on the dispute settlement mechanism, but in most cases, if the other parties are also 
members of the WTO, these specifi c rules on dispute resolving methods have only a 
subsidiary character in nature, e.g. several regional or bilateral trade agreements exclude 
trade defence instruments from the scope of specifi c dispute settlement provisions, which, 
therefore, can be complained about only in the WTO dispute settlement procedure.
b)  Rebalancing of concessions or other obligations in response to a safeguard measure 
taken by a third country under the WTO Agreement on Safeguards and other free trade 
agreements
When countries apply the ‘escape clauses’ of trade agreements, specifi cally the safeguard 
measures in terms of article XIX of GATT and the WTO Agreement on Safeguards, the 
European Union, in return, has the right to demand concessions. According to article 8 of 
Agreement on Safeguards, generally the restricting country has to offer trade compensation 
for the adverse effects of the restrictive safeguard measure. If the parties cannot fi nd a 
compromise on the concessions, the Agreement on Safeguards gives the right to the country 
affected by the safeguard to take rebalancing measures against the restricting country (e.g. 
introducing additional customs duties, etc.). In general, other bilateral and regional free 
trade agreements include the possibility of rebalancing trade concessions, therefore the 
Regulation can apply in those contexts as well.
c)  Modifi cation of concessions by a WTO member under Article XXVIII of the GATT, where 
no compensatory adjustments have been agreed
Principally, article XXVIII of the GATT gives members the right to propose modifi cations 
of their contracted concessions within consultations with the other parties. If the countries 
involved cannot come to an agreement, the contracting party that initiated the negotiations 
has the right to modify its concessions unilaterally; however, rebalancing measures can be 
taken by countries that are entitled to by article XVIII of the GATT (e.g. countries having 
substantial interest or principal supplying interest, etc.). Even though the EU has not yet 
withdrawn concessions under Article XXVIII of the GATT, the possibility could arise and 
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in that case the regulation would facilitate an effective procedural background to decide on 
withdrawal or modifi cation of certain concessions, which have to occur within short 
deadlines.
If action is necessary to safeguard the Union’s trade interest, the European Commission 
has to pursue implementation actions determining the appropriate commercial policy 
measures. The Regulation lays down the conditions, which implementation actions must 
follow [Article 4 of the Regulation]. These requirements refer partly to the relevant legal 
provisions and limitations of any retaliatory action introduced by the European Union; and 
specify general concerns, which determine the commercial policy measure to be chosen 
(e.g. effectiveness, potential of the measures to provide relief to EU economic operators, 
avoidance of disproportionate administrative complexity and costs in the application of the 
measures, etc.). The possible commercial policy measures include customs duties 
(suspension of tariff concessions, imposition of new customs duties, etc.), quantitative and 
other administrative restrictions (quotas, import or export licences, etc.), and suspension of 
concessions regarding goods, services or suppliers in the area of public procurement. The 
Regulation sets down a reasonable institutional method, seeing that the adoption of the 
commercial policy measures will be carried out within the standard comitology procedure 
established by Regulation (EU) No 182/2011,51 and the Commission shall be assisted by the 
committee established by the so called Trade Barriers Regulation.52 In other words, neither 
new nor parallel institutions have to be set up following the Regulation.
As a result, the Trade Enforcement Regulation will allow the European Union to 
implement trade retaliatory actions within a clear and effi cient horizontal procedural 
framework, when EU trade interests are at stake. Moreover, the Regulation can effectively 
encourage countries adopting trade restrictions to comply with international trade law 
obligations and remove illicit trade measures; therefore the very purpose of the new 
Regulation is to provide more compliance and not at all place a protectionist tool in the 
hands of the Commission. From the point of view of European companies and other 
business operators the impressive features of the new regulation are that on the one hand, it 
simplifi es the procedures under which the EU can take countermeasures, resulting in shorter 
and less complex comitology procedures. On the other hand, it is also important that the 
Regulation will have an impact not only on the trade of goods, but also included is the 
suspension of concessions in the fi eld of services. Therefore, the potential of the Regulation 
has been extended to a wider range of business actors that all will be able to take advantage 
of the swift and compact procedures governed by the Regulation, when facing barriers in 
regard to international trade.
The regulation cites ‘general interest’ and ‘Union’s interest’ in several places but no 
clarifi cation has been given in defi ning these terms. Technically it means that the 
Commission is entitled to interpret these categories and decide which factors have to be 
taken into consideration when imposing measures.
51 Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 
2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member 
States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers.
52 Council Regulation (EC) No 3286/94 of 22 December 1994 laying down Community 
procedures in the fi eld of the common commercial policy in order to ensure the exercise of the 
Community’s rights under international trade rules, in particular those established under the auspices 
of the World Trade Organization.
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5. CONCLUSION – ‘UNION INTEREST’ AS A SPECIFIC PUBLIC POLICY 
CONSIDERATION
As the previous analysis has shown ‘Union interest’ in the fi eld of CCP is a relatively well 
developed category and legal concept shaped by the practice of the Commission. In trade 
defence procedures, the Commission takes into consideration the interests of several actors 
and tries to aggregate these concerns. In other words, the Union interest test is based on an 
appreciation of all various interests taken as a whole. It should be noted that the Commission 
presently considers only economic factors and is trying to reject all attempts of stakeholders 
to submit other policies, e.g. environmental policy grounds. Probably the weakest point of 
current regulation and practice is the relativeness of the respective EU industry to other 
stakeholders. The current situation seems to refl ect an uneven playing fi eld in favour of the 
affected EU industry, because in terms of presuming Union interest, other stakeholders have 
to stand the proportionality test as well. But despite this fact, it is notable that the concept 
of ‘Union interest’ is well determined in legal terms, and even if it covers predominantly 
the interest of the relevant EU industry, other concerns, partial interests can be taken into 
consideration within the ‘Union interest test’ as well. In other words the EU approach would 
appear to have an advantage in that it clearly sets out the – purely economic – interests 
involved, which ensures a transparent and foreseeable application of the ‘Union interest test.’ 
Although the new trade enforcement regulation seems to provide a more abstract 
category of ‘Union interest’ than that which trade defence instruments are based on, it is 
most likely that the Commission will follow the same criteria, which have been developed 
in the practice of trade defence instruments. In other words, the Commission will possess a 
wide margin of discretion when balancing the interests of the relevant actors, and it is also 
expected, that it will make decisions based on only economic grounds. The latter argument 
is underpinned by the textual interpretation as well, since the preamble of the regulation 
refers to the safeguard of EU economic interests.53
Noticing these characteristics, the concept of ‘Union interest’ can be regarded as a 
rather specifi c ‘public interest’ aggregated at EU level, than a kind of abstract, supranational 
interest of the European Union. However, it is not suggested here that supranational interest 
– in terms of international relations theory – does not exist at all. The conclusion says only 
that the concept of ‘Union interest’ in external trade law is rather similar to a category of 
‘public interest’, or a public policy consideration which is composed of interests of EU 
industry and other stakeholders. This ‘EU public interest’ can be clearly differentiated from 
other, “public interest” considerations set out by founding treaties54 because these 
considerations are accumulated at the EU level and the Commission, thanks to recent 
procedural reform, can make a decision on Union interest more or less independently of 
Member States. 
53 Regulation (EU) No 654/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council, preamble 
paragraph 2. However, it is questionable, whether the legislator has intentionally distinguished 
between the ‘general interest’ and the ‘Union’s interest’ in the text of the regulation. In view of the 
fact that the ‘general interest’ comes up only once in the text and the context does not refer to any 
specifi city, it may be hypothesized that the distinction is unintentional. 
54 See e.g. Article 36 TFEU in context of the free movement of goods. Unlike the ‘Union 
interest’ in the fi eld of CCP, this public policy exception is based on the individual Member States’ 
considerations, therefore a Member State itself are entitled to refer domestic – i.e., national – public 
policy interests. 
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